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 How Do World Bank Projects 
 Commit to Citizen 
 Engagement?
Former president Jim Yong Kim 
attempted to confront these kinds of 
concerns in 2013, promising that the 
World Bank would ‘become a better 
listener’ by incorporating feedback into 
all projects with ‘clear beneficiaries’. 
World Bank management then made 
Kim’s pledge obligatory, requiring that 
investment projects meet specific 
benchmarks, including:
• integrating at least one citizen 
engagement (CE) mechanism into 
project design, 
• constructing at least one indicator to 
measure CE progress, 
• reporting on that indicator during 
implementation. 
To provide guidance for how large-scale 
development projects can develop 
citizen response capacity and make 
projects responsive to their inputs, the 
World Bank developed the Strategic 
Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen 
Engagement (‘CE Strategic Framework’). 
It defines CE as: 
The two-way interaction between 
citizens and governments [emphasis 
added] or the private sector within the 
scope of World Bank Group 
interventions… that gives citizens a 
stake in decision-making with the 
objective of improving the 
intermediate and final development 
outcomes of the intervention. 
Both the CE concept and the CE 
Strategic Framework are outcomes 
of more than 45 years of evolving 
approaches to engagement between 
the World Bank, civil society, and 
project-affected people. What makes 
the current CE commitment distinct 
from prior approaches is the World 
Bank management’s claim that including 
beneficiary feedback is no longer 
optional. In 2018, the World Bank 
launched its new Environmental and 
Social Framework (ESF), which for the 
first time requires projects to undertake 
stakeholder assessment plans. The 
ESF operates on a track parallel to 
the CE commitment, though they are 
potentially mutually reinforcing. 
The World Bank touts that meeting 
its CE requirements makes projects 
‘citizen-oriented’. More realistically, such 
standards merely establish a minimum 
threshold for citizen involvement that 
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The World Bank provides one of the world’s largest sources of international 
development funding, in 2019 committing US$62.3bn in loans, grants, 
equity investments, and guarantees to governments and private businesses. 
The institution’s responsibilities to partner governments are well defined. 
Yet its duty to consider the perspectives and experiences of those affected 
by its projects, as well as of civil society more broadly, remains ambiguous. 
Long-standing concerns about whether and how the World Bank 
demonstrates accountability to citizens have become amplified as it expands 
involvement in fragile, conflict-, and violence-affected settings. 
“What makes 
the current CE 
commitment 
distinct 
from prior 
approaches is 
the World Bank 
management’s 
claim that 
including 
beneficiary 
feedback is no 
longer optional.”
projects must reach, rather than lead to 
developing projects that are fundamentally 
oriented to citizen-identified needs and 
perspectives. Still, given the World Bank’s 
institutional clout and the proportion of 
development assistance it administers, if 
projects actually meet higher standards for 
CE, they can potentially protect and foster the 
contribution of citizen voice to development 
effectiveness. 
In this context, the Accountability Research 
Center (ARC) at American University 
conducted research to answer this question: 
how and to what degree does the World Bank 
fulfil institutional commitments to incorporating 
CE into project design, the critical early stage of 
donor involvement? Undertaken as part of the 
Action for Empowerment and Accountability 
(A4EA) research programme into large 
donor efforts to enable empowerment 
and accountability in fragile, conflict-, and 
violence-affected settings, ARC reviewed CE 
in World Bank project design for 57 projects in 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan, 
which had been approved in Fiscal Years (FY) 
2015–17. The resulting independent country 
analyses and a comparative synthesis report, 
including a detailed methods discussion, are 
available online. 
ARC developed an original assessment tool 
to identify the nature of the World Bank’s 
commitments to CE in project design. 
Relying on official project documents 
made public on the World Bank’s online 
operations portal and the CE categories laid 
out in the Bank’s CE Strategic Framework, 
the tool helps users to identify whether and 
how projects commit to: 
• CE mechanisms planned throughout the 
project life cycle, including but not limited 
to public meetings, satisfaction surveys, and 
participatory monitoring, 
• additional, planned mechanisms that go 
beyond consultation and could facilitate 
an enabling environment for CE, including 
third-party monitoring, specific social 
inclusion actions, and plans for proactive 
information disclosure. 
 
The assessment informs analysis to answer 
two overarching questions: 
• To what degree do World Bank projects 
demonstrate a commitment to explicit 
minimum standards for informed CE? 
• To what degree do projects go beyond 
minimalist approaches and demonstrate 
both depth and specificity in their CE 
commitments, as well as a potential for 
synergy across multiple CE commitments? 
This focus on design-related findings 
spells out a baseline for accountability, 
and can inform independent, field-based 
assessments of how CE commitments are 
implemented. The distinction between 
projects with mere ‘tick-the-box’ approaches 
vs more robust sets of CE commitments 
can also inform stakeholder decisions about 
whether and how to engage. In addition, 
ARC has partnered with Southern civil 
society organisations to pilot independent 
monitoring of CE implementation in select 
World Bank projects in Colombia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, and Uganda.
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“Given the World 
Bank’s… clout and 
the proportion of 
development 
assistance it 
administers, 
[projects meeting 
higher standards 
for citizen 
engagement]…
can potentially 
protect and 
foster the 
contribution of 
citizen voice to 
development 
effectiveness.”
Citizen Engagement 
Density Scale
The Accountability Research Center 
(ARC) approach is consistent with 
the World Bank’s own Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG)’s 2018 study 
of CE, distinguishing between projects 
that apply ‘thick citizen engagement 
that is regular and continuous, uses 
multiple tools, and is embedded in 
country systems’ and those that apply 
‘thin approaches using only one or two 
mechanisms [that] are short-lived’. 
ARC then applied an original ‘Citizen 
Engagement Density Scale’ to rank 
the ‘thickness’ of project commitments 
to CE across five categories: robust, 
comprehensive, intermediate, weak, and 
low. At the highest end of this spectrum, 
the robust assessment signifies that a 
project has committed to including a 
combination of multiple tactics for 
engagement that together create 
strategic opportunities and can be 
mutually reinforcing. The CE Density 
Scale aims to differentiate between 
the Bank’s institutional standards for 
CE, which set a floor for the minimum 
level of CE that projects must report 
on, and the pursuit of comprehensive 
approaches to CE that raise the 
ceiling on what projects could actually 
accomplish. 
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“Projects rarely 
specify dedicated 
funding for CE in 
project design, 
turning it into an 
unfunded mandate 
which must 
compete with 
other priorities.”
Figure 1 CE Density Scale – combined results from 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan
Key findings
• Most of the 57 projects analysed commit 
to incorporating multiple CE mechanisms 
throughout the project life cycle, with 
almost half (27) ranked as robust, the top 
category on the CE Density Scale (see 
Figure 1). Most projects therefore exceed 
the World Bank’s minimum CE design 
requirements and, in so doing, offer the 
potential for CE to have strategic impacts. 
•  However, analysis of the content of 
commitments revealed that most projects 
– even those in the top two categories 
of ‘robust’ and ‘comprehensive’ – only 
describe their plans in general terms; 
few explain how CE commitments will be 
implemented. This finding underscores the 
importance of independent monitoring of 
how CE commitments are implemented 
to determine whether they actually lead 
to real, meaningful opportunities for input 
and engagement, or whether they remain 
perfunctory, ‘tick-the-box’ exercises.
• Most projects (80 per cent) incorporate 
at least one CE indicator. However, 
the indicators typically used, the data 
captured, and the results made available 
are so narrowly framed that they do not 
meaningfully inform the public about the 
nature and impact of civic involvement. 
• Project-specific grievance redress 
mechanisms (GRMs) are the most common 
CE modality (selected by 91 per cent of 
projects). However, just under a quarter of 
projects (23 per cent) commit to reporting 
GRM results to World Bank management, 
and even fewer commit to disclosing 
results publicly. This finding means that key 
information about the most common CE 
mechanisms will most likely be inaccessible – 
including fundamental facts about the nature 
of complaints and how, or if, they are resolved.
• There is a significant discrepancy between 
plans to deploy CE mechanisms and 
commitments to proactively disclose their 
results. This reveals the Bank’s limited 
transparency and public accountability goals, 
and poses a significant threat to the ability of 
CE to achieve accountability outcomes.
• Only one project among the 57 reviewed 
made its operational manual readily 
accessible to the public. The operational 
manual is extremely relevant for informed 
CE because it spells out government 
plans for translating project commitments 
into specific goals, actions, rules, and 
responsibilities. While such manuals 
may appear to be mere administrative 
documents, they serve as potential 
roadmaps to guide public accountability 
strategies. However, the World Bank’s 
existing public information disclosure policy 
does not apply to operational manuals.
• Most projects that include provisions 
for third-party monitoring use it as a 
management tool rather than as an input 
to inform CE. The lack of commitments to 
public disclosure of third-party monitoring 
results means that even if external monitors 
maintain independence from project 
implementers, their work loses its value as 
an accountability tool for the public. 
• Projects consistently made commitments 
to proactive social inclusion in CE processes 
around gender. In contrast, few projects 
documented plans to ensure that other 
socially excluded groups (e.g. people with 
disabilities, youth, internally displaced people, 
and ethnic minorities) would have a voice in 
project-facilitated engagement. 
• Projects rarely specify dedicated funding 
for CE in project design, turning it into an 
unfunded mandate must compete with other 
priorities. As long as this situation continues, 
even projects that make ambitious CE 
commitments may not deliver on them.
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Policy recommendations
Provide more explicit support to strengthen the enabling environment 
for CE. The World Bank’s CE Strategic Framework does not mandate or 
prioritise investments in key elements of the enabling environment for informed 
citizen action, such as proactive social inclusion, independent monitoring, or 
proactive information disclosure. When CE efforts focus only on project-
related mechanisms (i.e. consultation spaces and feedback hotlines) without 
simultaneously working to strengthen the overall enabling environment in which 
these are situated, processes can be neutered by more powerful interest groups. 
In fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings, official spaces for participation 
are especially vulnerable to elite capture. World Bank staff may also be unaware 
of this (especially if project monitoring is not specifically designed to detect such 
problems). The lack of timely proactive disclosure of relevant monitoring findings 
limits citizens’ capacity to hold their governments and the World Bank accountable 
for their CE commitments.
Mandate that project operational manuals should be made public, readily 
accessible to citizens, and available in all national languages. Unlike other World 
Bank project documents, operational manuals define both the responsibilities 
allocated to government actors and agencies, and the rules they must follow – 
thus providing the baseline for accountability. Yet this research found that the 
Bank’s public information policy does not cover the disclosure of operational 
manuals and that therefore public release ultimately depends on the discretion 
of government officials and Bank teams, who do not necessarily recognise the 
relevance of disclosure (or can be threatened by such disclosure). 
Collaborate directly with national accountability institutions to protect citizen 
voice from reprisals and bolster state capacity to address accountability 
failures (e.g. ombuds agencies, audit bureaus, human rights commissions, 
public prosecutors, information access agencies). The Bank’s current CE 
approach neglects the risks that citizens take when exercising voice – and rarely 
invests in the kinds of national institutions whose missions are to focus on 
accountability and transparency. The World Bank would vastly improve the odds 
of meeting its CE goals if it were to provide direct project support to national 
accountability agencies to carry out their distinctive roles and responsibilities 
within the accountability process. This would ultimately be more effective and 
have longer-term impacts than projects attempting to contribute to an enabling 
environment for CE in isolation. 
Systematically link the CE agenda with the Bank’s new Environmental and 
Social Framework as these are mutually reinforcing. The ESF policy, supported 
by strict guidelines and dedicated staff, has a level of internal institutional 
enforcement that is missing from the CE agenda. Yet the ESF’s requirement for 
robust stakeholder engagement plans ties directly in with the principles that guide 
the World Bank’s approach to CE. Where the CE agenda and the ESF overlap – 
particularly in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings – there is now a new, 
powerful entry point to push for and pursue robust and strategic CE.
